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Constitutional Law-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-STATE STATUTE PROHIBITING PRIVATE CONSENSUAL SODOMY Is CONSTITUTIONAL-Doe V.
Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975),
aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
John Doe and Richard Roe, active homosexuals, 1 brought an
action before a three-judge federal district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from a Virginia statute proscribing sodomy. 2 They alleged that enforcement of the statute would deny
them important constitutional guarantees, including due process
and the right of privacy.
The court denied the relief prayed for and found that within
the circumstances of the case the statute was not unconstitutional and that the "wisdom or policy" of the statute was a matter
for the state's determination. One judge dissented, viewing the
statute as violative of plaintiffs' right of privacy. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in a memorandum
decision. 3
I.

BACKGROUND

Sodomy is an offense of ancient origin. Having its inception
no later than Biblical times, 4 it remained an infraction of only
1. Brieffor Plaintiffs at 1, Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
2. Act of Apr. 2, 1968, ch. 427, 1968 Va. Acts 529 (amending VA. CODE § 18.1-212
1950)) (current version at VA. CODE§ 18.2-361 (1975)). Subsequent amendment has not
changed the substance of the offense:
Crimes against nature.-lf any person shall carnally know in any manner any
brute animal, or carnally know any male or female person by the anus or by or
with the mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall
be guilty of a Class 6 felony.
VA. CODE § 18.2-361 (1975).
3. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem.,
425 U.S. 901 (1976). In the Supreme Court, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens
voted to hear arguments in the case. 425 U.S. at 901. The same day, the Court also denied
a petition for certiorari in State v. Enslin, 25 N.C. App. 662, 214 S.E.2d 318, cert. denied,
appeal dismissed, 288 N.C. 245, 217 S.E. 2d 669 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 903 (1976).
Enslin had unsuccessfully contended that his indictment for committing "the abominable
and detestable crime against nature" was unconstitutional. 25 N.C. App. at 663, 214
S.E.2d at 319.
4. Leviticus 18:22-23; I Corinthians 6:9. Some courts and writers see sodomy laws
today as an unmitigated extension of the original religious prohibition. See, e.g., State v.
Trejo, 83 N.M. 511, 514, 494 P.2d 173, 176(Ct. App. 1972) (Sutin, J., dissenting); Note,
The Avowed Lesbian Mother and Her Right to Child Custody: A Constitutional Challenge
That Can No Longer Be Denied, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 799, 800-12 (1975). Other writers
view the Judeo-Christian tradition as a source of the sodomy laws but in addition discern
modem psychological factors behind the continued existence of the laws. See, e.g., G.
WEINBERG, SociETY AND THE HEALTHY HOMOSEXUAL 11-18 (1972).
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ecclesiastical law throughout the Middle Ages. In 1533, under a
statute enacted by Parliament, the English secular courts began
to punish "the detestable and abominable Vice of Buggery. " 5
That statute served as the foundation for later American laws
against sodomy, 6 most of which still exist.

A.

Current Status of Sodomy Laws

Presently, by means of general sodomy statutes which ostensibly prohibit "unnatural" acts between heterosexuals and homosexuals alike, thirty-one states and the District of Columbia provide criminal sanctions for consenting adults who engage in
private hotnosexual conduct. 7 Two states expressly forbid only
5. Act for the Punishment of the Vice of Buggery, 1533, 25 Hen. 8, c. 6; W. BARNETI,
SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 2 (1973); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *216;
2 F. PoLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 556-57 (2d ed. 1959). The crime
had become so "detestable and abominable" by Blackstone's time that that noted scholar
refused to refer to it by name, calling it instead "the infamous crime against nature." 4
W. BLACKSTONE, supra at *215; R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 389-90 (2d ed. 1969). Hence
the wording in many of today's statutes. Note 7 infra. Interestingly enough, sodomy at
early common law apparently did not include fellatio or cunnilingus. Perkins v. State, 234
F. Supp. 335, 336 (W.D.N.C. 1964); R. PERKINS, supra at 390; Note, The Crimes Against
Nature, 16 J. Pus. L. 159, 162 (1967). Today, however, the majority of the states that
proscribe sodomy include fellatio and cunnilingus under the generic term of sodomy. W.
BARNETI, supra at 24; MonEL PENAL ConE § 207.5, Comment (Tent. Draft No.4, 1955);
R. PERKINS, supra at 390.
6. Comment, The Homosexual's Legal Dilemma, 27 ARK. L. REv. 687, 689 (1973);
Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 273, 275-76 (1971).
One court has noted that "[t]he 18th Century American legislatures forbade sodomy to
express moral outrage at the act itself and to prevent a general deterioration of the moral
fiber of the populace." United States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606, 607 (M.D. Pa. 1973),
aff'd mem., 491 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974).
7. ALA. ConE tit. 14, § 106 (1958); ALAs. STAT. § 11.40.120 (Supp 1975); ARiz. REv.
STAT. § 13-651 (West Supp. 1973); D.C. ConE§ 22-3502 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02
(West 1976) (Florida's sodomy statute was held unconstitutional, but prosecutions for
"unnatural and lascivious" acts may still be allowed under § 800.02. Franklin v. State,
257 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. 1971). But cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011 (West 1976)); GA. CODE
ANN.§ 26-2002 (1972); IDAHO ConE§ 18-6605 (Supp. 1975). IowA CoDE ANN.§ 705.1 (West
1950) (The Iowa statute has been held unconstitutional as applied to sodomitic acts
performed in private between consenting adults of the opposite sex. State v. Pilcher, 242
N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976)); KY. REv. STAT. §§ 510.070-.100 (1975); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§§
14-89, 89.1 (West Supp.1976); Mo. ANN. ConE art. 27, §§ 553-554 (1976); MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 272, § 34 (West 1970) (The Massachusetts statute has been construed as inapplicable to the private, consensual conduct of adults. Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318
N.E.2d 478 (Mass. 1974)); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.158, .338, .338a (1968); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 609.293, .294 (West Supp. 1976); Miss. ConE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1973); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 563.230 (Vernon 1953); MoNT. REv. ConEs ANN.§ 94-4118 (1947); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 201.190 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:143-1 to -2 (West 1969); N.Y. PENAL LAw
§§ 130.38 to -.50 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 886 (West 1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 3101, 3124 (Purdon 1973); R.I. GEN.
LAws§ 11-10-1 (1956); S.C. ConE§ 16-412 (1962); TENN. ConE ANN.§ 39-707 (1975); UTAH
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homosexual sodomy o8 Seventeen states no longer maintain any
criminal penalties for private, consensual sodomy 9
The sodomy statutes that remain have come under an increasingly heavy barrage of criticismo 10 Detractors contend that
0

ConE ANN. §§ 76-5-403 to -497 (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2603 (1974) (In
addition to fellatio, which is proscribed by Vermont's statute, sodomy has been held to
be a crime under the common law of Vermont in State v. La Forrest, 71 Vt. 311, 45 A.
225 (1899)); VA. ConE§ 18.2-361 (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 944.17 (West 1958); Wvo. STAT.
§ 6-98 (Supp. 1975).
Most of these statutes describe the forbidden behavior in terms of "the crime against
nature," "buggery," or "sodomy." None of the statutes declare homosexuality itself to be
a crime, rather the homosexual's means of sexual expression is defined as criminal. W.
BARNETT, supra note 5, at 7; Sherwin, Sodomy, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAw 430 (R.
Slovenko ed. 1965). Depending on the state, sodomy may be a misdemeanor or a felony,
and the punishment may range from three months in jail and a fine to imprisonment for
life. W. BARNETT, supra note 5, at 287-88. Although on their face the statutes provide for
punishment of all "unnatural" sexual acts, whether between homosexuals, unmarried
heterosexuals, or husband and wife, the real effect of the law today is to exclude the
private, consensual activity of married persons from proscribed behavior. See notes 3644, 48-49 and accompanying text infra. The statutes also provide the means to punish
those who commit sodomy in public, by force, or with a minor. In this respect, there is no
great debate over the need or worth of the statutes. The discussion in this note is thus
concerned with the sodomy statutes as applied to consenting adults acting in private.
8. KAN. STAT.§ 21-3505 (1974); TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. tit. 5, § 21.06 (Vernon 1974).
9. No. 928, § 3, 1975 Ark. Acts 2463 (repealing ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 41-813 (1964)); CAL.
PENAL ConE§§ 286, 228(a) (West Supp. 1976); CoLO. REv. STAT.§§ 18-3-401 to -405 (Supp.
1976); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-65, 53a-70 to -73a (West Supp. 1976); DEL. ConE tit.
11, §§ 765-66 (Supp. 1975); HAW. REv. STAT.§§ 707-733 to -737 (Special Pamphlet 1975);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 11-2 to -6 (1973); Pub. L. No. 148, § 24, 1976 Ind. Acts (repealing
IND. ConE ANN. § 35-1-89-1 (Burns 1975)); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §§ 251, 253 to 255
(West 1976); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A: 1 to :5 (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN.§§
40A-9-21 to -22 (Supp.1975); N.D. CENT. ConE§§ 12.1-20-02 to -07 (1976); OHIO REv. ConE
ANN. §§ 2907.03 to .06 (Page 1975); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 163.305 to .445 (1975); ch. 158, §
22-8 1976 S.D. Sess. Laws 262 (repealing S.D. CoMPILED LAws ANN. § 22-22-21 (1967));
WASH. REv. ConE ANN. § 9A.98.010(209) (Special Pamphlet 1976) (repealing WASH. REv.
ConE ANN. § 9.79.100 (1961)); W. VA. ConE § 61-8B-1 to -9 (Supp. 1976). Some of the
cited statutes are repeals of traditional sodomy laws; others are new codifications that do
not proscribe the consensual activity of adults. California's new, so-called "consenting
adults law" may be a forerunner of liberalized sodomy statutes yet to appear, in other
states. The former law read: "Every person who is guilty of the infamous crime against
nature, committed with mankind or with any animal, is punishable by imprisonment in
the state prison not less than one year." CAL. PENAL CoDE § 286 (West 1970) (amended
1975). The present statute removes all penalties except where the act is committed with
a minor, by force, or while confined in a state prison. CAL. PENAL CoDE§ 286 (West Supp.
1976); 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 40 (1976).
10. See, e.g., W. BARNETT, supra note 5; W. CHURCHILL, HoMOSEXUALBEHAVIORAMONG
MALES 215-22 (1967); A. KINSEY, W. PoMEROY, C. MARTIN, & P. GEBHARD, SExuAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 483 (1953); Slovenko, A Panoramic View: Sexual Behavior
and the Law, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW (R. Slovenko ed. 1965); Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-A Right to be Different?, 38 ALB. L. REv. 84 (1973); Comment,
The Homosexual's Legal Dilemma, 27 ARK. L. REv. 687 (1973); Note, The Constitionality
of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1613 (1974); Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 273 (1971); Comment,
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although prosecutions for private consensual acts are rare, 11 there
is nonetheless the constant threat of prosecution. 12 In addition,
the laws lend support to other legal disabilities. For example,
homosexuals may be ineligible for employment in certain government jobs, 13 for service in the armed forces, 14 or for permission to
immigrate into the country .15 The statutes generally encourage
private and public discrimination of all kinds against homosexuals and provide means for the blackmail and exploitation of
offenders. 16 Finally, the laws represent an explicit legal stigma on
the lifestyle of homosexuals, most of whom, presumably, would
prefer to live within the bounds of lawful conduct.

B.

Constitutional Attacks

As a result of the criticism of the sodomy laws, there has been
some legislative reform, 17 but most state legislatures are hesitant
to seemingly condone conduct that is still repugnant to many
voting citizens. 18 The battle thus has often been fought in the
courts, where opponents of the sodomy laws-either defendants
Sexual Freedom for Consenting Adults-Why Not?, 2 PAC. L.J. 206 (1971); Note, The
Avowed Lesbian Mother and Her Right to Child Custody: A Constitutional Challenge
That Can No Longer Be Denied, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 799 (1975).
11. W. BARNETT, supra note 5, at 7. Indeed, without exceeding permissible search and
seizure limitations, law enforcement officials find it nearly impossible to enforce the laws
against consenting adults acting in private. See Project-The Consenting Adult Homosexual and the Law: An Empirical Study of Enforcement and Administration in Los Angeles
County, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 643, 689 (1966). Thus, in California's experience, actual
enforcement of sodomy laws against consenting adults was limited to instances where the
activity occurred in public. ld. at 718; Comment, Sexual Freedom for Consenting
Adults-Why Not?, 2 PAC. L.J. 206, 214 (1971). Even then, because judges were unwilling
to impose a felony penalty for a consensual act, many cases were disposed of as "disorderly
conduct" misdemeanors. See Project, supra at 685. In the instant case, plaintiff testified
by deposition that he neither knew of nor had heard of any individual who had been
arrested for private, consensual homosexual activity. Brief for Defendants at4-5. Nevertheless, he testified that his enjoyment of homosexual acts is "chilled" by his fear of arrest.
ld. at 5.
12. Brief for Defendants at 5. W. BARNETT, supra note 5, at 7-8.
13. See Note, Government-Created Employment Disabilities of the Homosexual, 82
HARv. L. REv. 1738 (1969).
14. See Comment, Homosexuals in the Military, 37 FoRDHAM L. REv. 465 (1969);
Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 273, 279 (1971).
15. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(1970) (construed in Boutilier v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967)).
16. W. BARNETT, supra note 5, at 8-9; Note, The Crimes Against Nature, 16 J. Pus.
L. 159, 162, 175-77 (1967); Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17
N.Y.L.F. 273, 279, 291, 299-302 (1971).
17. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
18. W. BARNETT, supra note 5, at 4-5; Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-An
Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F. 273, 295 (1971).
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charged with the crime of sodomy or plaintiffs seeking civil rights
relief-have utilized a number of arguments in attacking the constitutionality of the statutes. 19
1.

Void for vagueness

The most common argument against the constitutionality of
sodomy statutes-many of which forbid only "the crime against
nature" and do not mention the word "sodomy" or otherwise
define the offense-has been that the statutes are void for vagueness of language. Relying on the due process principle that a
person may be held criminally responsible only for conduct that
he can reasonably understand to be forbidden, 20 defendants in
sodomy prosecutions have alleged that the euphemistic term
"crime against nature" is archaic and not reasonably understandable today. 21 Most courts encountering the argument, however,
have not agreed and have held either that the phrase "crime
19. There are, of course, other constitutional arguments that have been employed in
addition to the ones here discussed. But these other arguments, while perhaps more
imaginative, are less formidable-at l~ast the courts seem to deal with them summarily
or ignore them entirely when they are raised in pleadings or on appeal. See,e.g., Raphael
v. Hogan, 305 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (statute as applied to public acts of sodomy
on stage does not violate right of freedom of speech); Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500
S.W. 2d 368 (1968) (statute does not violate Estabishment Clause or provide for cruel or
unusual punishment); People v. Parker, 33 Cal. App. 3d 842, 109 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1973)
(statute does not violate right to freedom of expression). In the instant case, plaintiffs
raised the issues of freedom of association, establishment of religion, freedom of expression, and cruel and unusual punishment. Brief for Pla.intiffs at 10-18, 20-21. The court,
however, ignored these issues. See 403 F. Supp. at 1199-1203. The poor showing in the
courts, however, has not discouraged legal writers from urging attacks based on the first
and eighth amendments and on other doctrines. E.g. W. BARNETT, supra note 5, at 74-83,
269-301; Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-A Right to Be Different?, 38 ALB. L.
REv. 84,96-99 (1973); Comment, Homosexuality and the Law-An Overview, 17 N.Y.L.F.
273, 297 (1971).
20. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274
u.s. 445, 459 (1927).
21. See, e.g., Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975); Connor v. Hutto, 516 F.2d 853 (8th
Cir. 1975); Wanzer v. State, 232 Ga. 523, 207 S.E.2d 466 (1974); State v. Mays, 329 So.
2d 65 (Miss. 1976); State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973); Carson v. State, 529
P.2d 499 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974). A statute that is more explicit in terms of the prohibited
conduct obviously does not have a potential "vagueness" handicap. The District of Columbia statute, for example, states:
Every person who shall be convicted of taking into his or her mouth or anus
the sexual organ of any other person or animal, or who shall be convicted of
placiing his or her sexual organ in the mouth or anus of any other person or
animal, or who shall be convicted of having carnal copulation in an opening of
the body except sexual parts with another person, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or be imprisoned for a period not exceeding ten years.
D.C. CODE § 22-3502 (1973).
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against nature" has continued to denote sodomy or buggery, as
it did at common law, 22 or that the phrase is not impermissibly
vague when read with state court decisions construing the Ianguage. 23
In Franklin v. State, 24 the Supreme Court of Florida held
that the state statute prohibiting the "abominable and detestable
crime against nature" 25 was unconstitutional for vagueness and
that changes in the law and in language had rendered the statute's meaning uncertain to today's "average man of common intelligence. " 28
While recognizing Florida's right to construe its own statutes, the Supreme Court of the United States in Wainwright v.
Stone 21 may have noted its disagreement in principle with the
"vagueness" holding in Franklin. 28 Then in Rose v. Locke, 29 the
Supreme Court reversed a finding of the Sixth Circuit that the
Tennessee sodomy statute30 was void for vagueness of language. 31
The Court in Rose determined that a sodomy statute forbidding
"the crime against nature" incorporated sufficient due process
warning to enable men to conduct themselves so as to avoid forbidden activity. 32
2.

Void for overbreadth

The Supreme Court has enunciated the doctrine that an activity subject to state regulation may not he proscribed by means
that sweep too broadly and thereby infringe upon a protected
freedom. 33 The doctrine, which allows a court to strike down a
statute on the basis of how it might be applied to others who are
not litigants but who might be affected adversely by an overly
22. See, e.g., State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748, 752 (1973).
23. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22-23 (1973).
24. 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971).
25. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.01 (West 1976) (repealed 1974).
26. 257 So. 2d at 23. The court, while thus holding that the defendant could not be
convicted of the crime against nature, then directed entry of judgment against the defendant for violation of FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1976)-the lesser offense of any
unnatural and lascivious act. 257 So. 2d at 24.
27. 414 u.s. 21 (1973).
28. ld. at 22-24. The Court stated that Florida's sodomy statute was "not void at the
time appellees performed the acts for which they were convicted." /d. at 24.
29. 423 u.s. 48 (1975).
30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-707 (1975).
31. 423 U.S. at 50, 52-53.
32. ld. at 50-51.
33. NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
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broad statute, has been asserted primarily in cases involving first
amendment rights. 34
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unconstitutionally include them. 42 The Supreme Court dismissed
an appeal. 43 In the interim, the plaintiff in Buchanan was tried
as a defendant in a state court and convicted of sodomy. His
appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was unsuccessful
and his petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court
was denied. 44

3.

Equal protection

According to the traditional equal protection test, the law
may not treat people differently unless the classification made is
rationally related to a legitimate state .purpose. 45 The application
of the test may be seen in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 46 where the Supreme Court found no rational explanation for a Massachusetts
statute that barred single persons from obtaining contraceptives
when married persons were able to obtain them. 47
Attempting to analogize Eisenstadt and extend the decision
to their own situations, defendants in a number of sodomy cases
42. 463 S.W.2d at 193.
43. 402 u.s. 902 (1971).
44. Buchanan v. State, 471 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
930 (1972). Denial of certiorari has little if any weight as stare decisis. See United States
v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434,461 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
491 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
In addition to the rationale that prosecutions of a husband and wife under a sodomy
statute may be "virtually inconceivable" and are thus de facto excluded from a sodomy
statute's meaning, courts have dismissed the void-for-overbreadth argument on other
grounds. One ground is that of justiciability: a number of courts have held that defendants
indicted for coercive or public sodomitic acts plainly do not have the standing to assert
the rights of third parties who theoretically could be indicted for private, consensual
conduct. See, e.g., Swikert v. Cady, 381 F. Supp. 988 (E.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd mem., 513
F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1975); Dawson v. Vance, 329 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Carter v.
State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974); Hughes v.
State, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299 (1972); State v. Crawford, 478 S.W.2d 314 (Mo.
1972). The Supreme Court is likewise presently reluctant to grant a defendant standing
to assert constitutional rights "vicariously." See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
610 (1973).
45. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973). A more
strict equal protection test might be required if it is argued sexual gratification is a
"fundamental right." Where a fundamental right is affected by a statute (e.g., a sodomy
statute), the courts will allow different classes (e.g., the class of married persons who
commit sodomitic acts and the class of unmarried persons who commit sodomitic acts)
to be treated differently only where a compelling state interest in the distinction is shown.
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). It might also be argued that classification based
on marital status or "sexual orientation," like race, is "suspect" and hence subject to the
more rigorous equal protection test. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(statute proscribing marriages between certain persons solely because of race violates
equal protection and due process clauses).
46. 405 u.s. 438 (1972).
47. 405 U.S. at 446-47.
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have reasoned that if no legitimate state purpose is served in
barring contraceptives from unmarried persons when married
persons are able to obtain them, then similarly, no legitimate
state purpose is served by a sodomy statute that intrudes upon
the sexual privacy of unmarried persons (whether heterosexual or
homosexual) but on the basis of Griswold v. Connecticut 48 is
virtually inapplicable to married couples. 49
The Court of Appeals of New Mexico, in State v. Elliott, 50
accepted this line of reasoning and held that the New Mexico
sodomy statute was unconstitutional. 51 Although a few lower state
courts in other jurisdictions have reached similar decisions, 52
overall the equal protection argument has not fared well. 53

4.

Substantive due process

According to substantive due process principles, 54 the fourteenth amendment not only provides for procedural safeguards
but also "expresses an integral philisophy of liberal democracy"55-the idea that in the absence of a compelling interest and
a showing of necessity, a state may not infringe upon fundamen48. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra.
49. See, e.g., Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on
other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); State v. Bateman,
113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299 (1972);
State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973).
50. 88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (Ct. App. 1975).
51. 88 N.M. at 193, 539 P.2d at 213. Under the newly adopted N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
40A-9-21 to -22 (Supp. 1975), private consensual sodo~y is no longer punishable in New
Mexico.
52. State v. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147 (Ct. App. 1975), rev 'd, 113
Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976). People v. Rice, 80 Misc. 2d 511, 363 N.Y.S.2d 484 (Dist. Ct.
1974); People v. Johnson, 77 Misc. 2d 889, 355 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Buffalo City Ct. 1974).
53. See cases cited in note 49 supra. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Lair,
62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973), distinguished Eisenstadt by saying that Eisenstadt
"touches in no way upon the right to marital privacy with which Griswold is concerned."
State v. Lair, 301 A.2d at 753. The state is not bound to protect equally the sexual privacy
of the married and the unmarried. "Much of our law, criminal and otherwise, bespeaks
the contrary." ld.
54. The doctrine of substantive due process grew out of late nineteenth and early
twentieth century cases overturning governmental business and labor regulations because
of alleged infringement upon economic freedoms. See Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F.
Supp. 843, 850-51 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.) cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); W. BARNETI, supra note 5, at 94-95. The doctrine has fallen
into disrepute in the economic context. ld. at 95. The principle, however, has not infrequently been used by the Supreme Court to judicially protect certain announced human
rights. Notes 57-62 and accompanying text infra. See generally Symposium, Allocation of
Policymaking Authority Between Court and Legislature, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 37.
55. Acanfora v. Board ofEduc., 359 F. Supp. 843,850-51 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on other
grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
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tal personalliberties. 56 Among the specific fundamental personal
liberties articulated by the Supreme Court in recent times are the
right to procreate, 57 the right of privacy in a group association, 58
the right of marital sexual privacy, 59 the right of freedom to
marry, 60 the right to obtain and use contraceptives, 61 and the right
to obtain an abortion. 62
Homosexuals have seen in these cases the matrix of one or
more additional "fundamental rights": the right to sexual fulfillment63 or an absolute right of privacy-especially in the home-as
to any conduct between consenting adults. 64 In upholding sodomy
statutes, however, courts generally have concluded that no fundamental right has been infringed upon or have recognized the
necessary state interest in a putative infringement. 65
5.

Right of privacy

Although the precise constitutional source of a general right
of privacy has not been declared by a majority of the Supreme
Court, its existence is undisputed. 66 The right has been integrally
associated with overbreadth, 67 equal protection, 68 and substantive
due process69 attacks on sodomy laws. Independent of the other
56. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496-98 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463-66 (1958).
57. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
58. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
59. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
60. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
61. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
62. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
63. E.g., United States v. Brewer, 363 F. Supp. 606, 607 (M.D. Pa. 1973): "(T]he
apparent trend of recent decisions would indicate that such a right [to 'deviant sexual
conduct'] among or between consenting adults does exist." W. BARNETI', supra note 5, at
97.
64. E.g., Swikert v. Cady, 381 F. Supp. 988 (E.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd mem., 513 F.2d
635 (7th Cir. 1975); Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on
other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); Dawson v. Vance,
329 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974); State v. Elliott, 88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (Ct. App.
1975); Canfield v. State, 506 P.2d 987 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973). See also United States v.
Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (''.The Constitution extends special safeguards to the
privacy of the home . . . .")
65. E.g., cases cited in note 64 supra.
66. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
67. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra.
68. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra.
69. See note 64 and accompanying text supra. The general right of privacy may in
fact be a substantive due process right. The substantive due process and right of privacy
arguments, however, are distinguished here for purposes of discussion.
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arguments, it has been strongly and frequently argued as mandating the invalidation of sodomy statutes as applied to consenting adults who act in private. 70 The Supreme Court, however, has
not yet held that the right of privacy embraces all of the private
sexual concerns of unmarried, consenting adults; and other courts
for the most part have not seen Griswold v. Connecticut, 11
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 72 and other privacy related decisions as indicative of how the Supreme Court would rule on the subject. 73

II.

INSTANT CASE

The litigants in the instant case raised issues based upon
many of the arguments previously employed against sodomy statutes, including the arguments of privacy, 74 substantive due process/5 equal protection,76 overbreadth, 77 and vagueness. 78 In delivering its opinion, however, the district court discussed only the
right of privacy issue and the interest of the state in its sodomy
statute, 79 and held that the statute was not unconstitutional on
its face or in its application to the plaintiffs' circumstances. 80 The
burden of the court's opinion was that the right of privacy as
enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut 81 applied to marital
privacy only; it was not to be extended to include "homosexual
intimacy. " 82
70. See, e.g., Connor v. Hutto, 516 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1975); Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F.
Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973); Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973),
aff'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); Dawson
v. Vance, 329 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D. Tex. 1971); State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d
6 (1976); Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905
(1974); Connor v. State, 253 Ark. 854, 490 S.W.2d 114 (1973); Hughes v. State, 14 Md.
App. 497, 287 A.2d 299 (1972).
71. 381 u.s. 479 (1965).
72. 405 u.s. 438 (1972).
73. See, e.g., State v. Hughes, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299, 304 (1972).
74. Brief for Plaintiffs at 3-10.
75. ld. at 18-20.
76. ld. at 21.
77. ld. at 20-21.
78. Brief for Defendants at 19-20.
79. 403 F. Supp. at 1200-03.
80. ld. at 1200.
81. 381 U.S. 479 (1965); notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra.
82. 403 F. Supp. at 1201. The court quoted Justice Harlan:
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State
forbids . . . , but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential
and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an institution which the
State not only must allow, but which always and in every age it has fostered
and protected. It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to forbid
extra-marital sexuality . . . or to say who may marry, but it is quite another
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The court further determined implicitly that the statute
could not have violated plaintiffs' due process or equal protection
rights. Having decided at the threshold that private, consensual
homosexual activity was not a fundamental liberty, the court did
not feel obligated to apply a strict "compelling state interest" test
of fourteenth amendment violation. 83 Instead, the court noted
that if the state had the burden of proving a "legitimate interest
in the subject of the statute" or that the statute was "rationally
supportable," then Virginia had fulfilled this obligation by the
intimation that the proscribed conduct was "likely to end in a
contribution to moral delinquency." 84 The statute, in other words,
was "appropriate in the promotion of morality and decency." 85
One of the three judges dissented. Viewing private,
consensual sexual acts between adults as liberties protected by
the right of privacy and in which the state has no legitimate
interest, the dissent saw the sodomy statute as a violation of
plaintiffs' right of privacy. 86 The dissent was confident that previous Supreme Court privacy decisions supported his view. 87
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district
court, 88 and later denied a petition for rehearing. 89

III.

ANALYSIS

Facets of the instant case to be analyzed in this note include
the district court's incomplete treatment of the issues, its holding
that a right of privacy does not protect the private, consensual
sexual conduct of homosexuals, and its view of the state's interest
in the maintenance of sodomy statutes proscribing such conduct.
To be noted also are the contradictions that the outcome of the
instant case represents in light of other recent Supreme Court
privacy decisions and the likely effect of the Supreme Court's
affirmance of the lower court's decision.
when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it
undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the details of that intimacy.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied). The
statement was later quoted with approval by Justice Goldberg in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (concurring opinion).
83. See 403 F. Supp. at 1202. See also note 45 supra.
84. 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
85. ld.
86. ld. at 1203-05 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
87. /d. at 1205.
88. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g mem. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
89. 425 u.s. 985 (1976).
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The Court's Incomplete Treatment of the Issues

The federal district court in the instant case focused its attention on probably the strongest argument against the constitutionality of sodomy laws-the argument that the general right of
privacy bars prosecution for private, consensual sodomy. 90 But
the court's determination that the right of privacy does not protect homosexual sodomy was not an automatic resolution of the
other issues raised. Answers to plaintiffs' equal protection and
due process arguments may be found, perhaps, in the court's
failure to find that sexual gratification or absolute privacy in the
home is a fundamental right. This failure may have been a result
of conscious deliberation, but the court's opinion does not evidence much consideration of the matter. Similarly, responses to
the vagueness and overbreadth issues may well be inferred from
Supreme Court decisions relative to the subjects; 91 but again, the
district court declined to address these issues. Had the court
answered all the issues raised, its opinion would have been virtually comprehensive of litigation involving sodomy statutes and,
with the Supreme Court's affirmance, 92 would have become
possibly the final word on the subject.
B.

Right of Privacy

The district court determined that the right of marital privacy announced in Griswold v. Connecticut 83 did not extend to
the private sexual conduct of homosexuals. In so determining, the
court ignored several post-Griswold privacy decisions of the Supreme Court, which many sodomy law opponents have read as
clearing the way for a judicial overturning of the laws.
1.

Other privacy decisions

In spite of the Supreme Court's paeans to the institution of
marriage in Griswold, 84 subsequent decisions have indicated that
90. This aspect of the court's opinion is discu8sed in notes 93-110 and accompanying
text infra.
91. E.g., Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975). Compare Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F.
Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Wadev. Buchanan, 401 U.S.
989 (1971) with Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
92. This aspect of the instant case is discussed in notes 120-123 and accompanying
text infra.
93. 381 u.s. 479 (1965).
94. "Marriage is a coming together for better or worse, hopefully enduring and, intimate to the degree of being sacred . . . . [I]t is an association for as noble a purpose as
any involved in our prior decisions." /d. at 486.
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the right of privacy in sexual matters was not necessarily inherent
in marriage but rather was inseparable from the individuals involved. "If the right of privacy means anything," the Supreme
Court stated in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 95 "it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 96
In the controversial case of Roe v. Wade, 97 the Court held
that the individual's right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, qualified by certain state interests. 98 After Roe, the
right of privacy in sexual and reproductive matters took on
sweeping dimensions: the individual's right of personal privacy
superceded (within certain time limitations) the state's interest
in protecting the unborn, 99 thus superceding the potential or
nascent rights to life of the unborn themselves. 100 While the Court
still refused "to recognize an unlimited right" to "do with one's
body as one pleases," 101 one could now do with one's body as one
pleased to an extraordinary degree.
Contributing to the Supreme Court's recognition of a greatly
expanded right to personal privacy (absent incontrovertible harm
to others) was Stanley v. Georgia. 102 Although Stanley dealt with
the regulation of obscenity and not sexual privacy, still it emphasized the Court's belief that some activities that are repugnant
or unquestionably illegal if carried out in public are nonetheless
protected if they occur in private: ''[T]he States retain broad
power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend
to mere possession [of pornography] by the individual in the
privacy of his own home. " 103 Along with Eisenstadt and Roe,
Stanley thus represented an expansion of the thitherto defined
bounds of the right to privacy.
2.

Lack of treatment of privacy cases by the district court

The district court did not mention Eisenstadt, Roe, or
Stanley, much less discuss the implications of these post95. 405 U.S. 438 (1972); notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra.
96. 405 U.S. at 453.
·
97. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
98. /d. at 154.
99. !d. at 154-66.
100. See id.
101. !d. at 154.
102. 394 u.s. 557 (1969).
103. 394 U.S. at 568 (emphasis supplied).
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Griswold decisions} 04 The court may have felt the implications
had been discussed sufficiently elsewhere. 105 It is more likely,
however, that the court realized that direct treatment of these
cases would have demanded a more rigorous analysis of privacy
issues in order to justify its position. 106
Whatever reasons it had for not discussing Eisenstadt, Roe,
or Stanley, the court might be faulted for avoiding a potentially
discomforting treatment. Already, on the basis of the Supreme
Court's privacy decisions, a New Mexico court had held its state's
sodomy statute unconstitutional; 107 the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts had construed that state's statute to be inapplicable to the private consensual conduct of adults regardless
ot sex or marital status; 108 and at least three federal courts had
intimated that the right of privacy might very well extend to any
private, consensual sexual act. 109
Any criticism of the court in the instant case would, however,
have to be greatly tempered when viewed in light of the Supreme
Court's affirmance of the decision. 110 Ignoring what could have
been clear portents in the earlier privacy cases, the district court
unerringly divined the Supreme Court's intention not to include
the private sodomitic conduct of homosexuals within the bounds
of the right of privacy.
C.

The State's Interest

After ruling that private homosexual activity was not protected by the right of privacy, the district court in the instant case
noted that the state was free to punish the conduct in question if
it wished to do so. 111 The court proceeded to show that the state
had a "legitimate interest in the subject of the statute" and that
104. Eisenstadt, Roe, and Stanley were discussed in plaintiffs' brief. Brief for Plaintiffs at 4.
105. See, e.g., State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 301 A.2d 748 (1973).
106. The dissent does not omit citation of Eisenstadt, Roe, and Stanley. 403 F. Supp.
at 1203-05.
107. State v. Elliott, 88 N.M. 187, 539 P.2d 207 (Ct. App. 1975).
108. Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 318 N.E.2d 478, 480-81 (Mass. 1974). The court
did not "decide whether a statute which explicitly prohibits specific sexual conduct, even
if consensual and private, would be constitutionally infirm." ld. at 481 (emphasis supplied).
109. Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973); United States v. Brewer,
363 F. Supp. 606 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 491 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 990 (1974); Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd on
other grounds, 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
110. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g mem. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
111. 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
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the statute was "rationally supportable." 112 In noting the state's
interest, the court mentioned the state's objective in the
"promotion of morality and decency. " 113 The court observed furthermore that "the longevity of the Virginia statute," while not
decisive of its constitutionality, "does testify to the State's interest and its legitimacy." 114 The intimation was that when the state
has, in the continued existence of a statute, an interest in morality and decency, and the standards of morality and decency
themselves are not arbitrary but have their bases in history and
civilization's experience, then courts must be slow to act; in such
circumstances, "the wisdom or policy" of a statute is generally
"a matter for the State's resolve." 115
Opponents of the sodomy laws wonder what real interest a
state has in the proscription of private, consensual homosexual
sodomy; they declare that such private, consensual acts are
"victimless" and are essentially products of personal moral judgments outside the area of the state's concern. 116 In the instant
case, except for the somewhat weak reference to the prevention
of "moral delinquency," 117 the district court did not adequately
address this position. Nonetheless, the court by its mention of
morality and decency signaled its refusal to admit that the morality and decency of citizens was not the state's concern.
Without a great deal of finesse, the court thus made an important and often neglected point: ascertaining and articulating
the morality of its citizens is of vital concern to the state. All
legislation, after all, is an embodiment of a collective social judgment as to what is right and wrong or fair and just. Food and drug
laws or progressive income taxes, for example, codify certain
moral decisions that people may make regarding the type of society they want. 118 The state's duty is primarily to implement
those choices. While the state should not be permitted to govern
112. /d. at 1202-03. The showing of rationality and the state's interest may have had
two purposes: (1) If the Supreme Court were to determine that the right of privacy did
apply to private, consensual homosexual sodomy, then the showing would hopefully serve
to satisfy due process and equal protection requirements. (2) An articulation of the rationality and state interest might well help forestall an inclusion of the proscribed behavior
within the right of privacy at the outset of consideration, and thus preclude any later and
more strict comparison of the rationality or interest with fourteenth amendment standards.
113. ld. at 1202.
114. ld.
115. ld. at 1200.
116. See sources cited in note 10 supra.
117. 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
118. Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals, 1960 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 174, 197-98.
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thought or even behavior within a wide range of limitation, it
must, for the society's own survival, hearken to collective judgments concerning what should be tolerated and what should not
be tolerated. Without broadly shared ideas in political and moral
matters, and the state's implementation of those ideas, the society would not exist.U 9
A state thus cannot afford to ignore the ideals, morals, aspirations, and fears of its constituent society. In this light, sodomy
laws provide more than criminal sanctions for a certain kind of
conduct. They become a manifestation of social policy, an indication of the type of community people want, a small component
of a necessary social cohesiveness. While there may be few prosecutions of homosexuals for private consensual violations of the
statutes and while it may perhaps be conceded that the violations
are "victimless" in a very strict sense, yet members of a society
by means of the statutes should be permitted to express their
collective disapproval of the activity and unequivocally state, in
effect, that they believe homosexuality, whatever its cause, is
undesirable, or that they prefer their children have the chance to
grow up having as little exposure to homosexual activity as possible.

D.

Inconsistencies Between the Supreme Court's Affirmance in
the Instant Case and Other Supreme Court Decisions

In its memorandum decision affirming the district court's
decision, the Supreme Court by implication raised one troubling
question: Can the outcome of the instant case be reconciled with
some of the earlier privacy cases-Roe v. Wade, for example?
Implicit in the district court's opinion in the instant case and
in the Supreme Court's affirmance was the balancing of two considerations in the threshold determination that homosexual sodomy is not protected by the right of privacy. One consideration
involved the bounds of the right of privacy as defined in Griswold,
Stanley, Eisenstadt, Roe, and earlier cases. 120 The other consider119. P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MoRALS 9-10 (1965). Note too a dissent from
the Supreme Court's now discredited economic substantive due process approach:
I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted
when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it
can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute
proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood
by the traditions of our people and our law.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
120. See notes 94-103 and accompanying text supra.
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ation was the experience of civilization and the interest of the
state and its citizens in articulating and maintaining a social
policy of disapprobation of certain activities. 121 In the instant
case, the latter consideration obviously weighed more heavily.
Why did it not weigh at least as heavily in other cases where the
stakes were arguably greater?
The result in Roe v. Wade, in particular, is shocking in light
of the instant case: the state may proscribe a homosexual's private, consensual sodomitic acts, but it may not proscribe the
termination of inchoate life. If the proscribed behavior in the
instant case had been considered to be activity protected by the
right of privacy, as was the conduct in Roe v. Wade, the sodomy
statutes would not have survived. If the conduct in Roe v. Wade
had been considered, on the bases of majority attitudes and
states' concern, primarily as a legitimate subject of proscription,
as was the behavior in the instant case, the anti-abortion statutes
undoubtedly would have survived. Did the Supreme Court give
too little weight to the right-of-privacy arguments in the instant
case, as some contend? 122 Or did the Court give too much weight
to right-of-privacy arguments in Roe v. Wade? 123 In the answer to
these questions may lie the ultimate irony of the instant case-or
the frightful irony of Roe v. Wade.
E.

End of the Court Battle

The Supreme Court's failure to address the right of privacy
argument-probably the strongest argument against the constitutionality of sodomy statutes-signals the termination, or at
least the postponement, of atfempts to judicially overturn sodomy laws. But the end of the court battle does not mean that
there is no change in the future for the laws. As previously
noted,t 24 . seventeen states no longer punish any private, consensual sodomitic acts of adults, whether homosexual or heterosexual, whether by persons married or single. Over twenty-eight
municipalities-many of them major cities such as New York,
San Francisco, Seattle, Detroit, and Minneapolis-have recently
enacted so-called "gay rights protection" ordinances. 125 Further121. See notes 111-119 and accompanying text supra.
122. E.g., CoNG. REc. H2552-53 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Koch); 122
CONG. REC. E1686 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Abzug).
123. See generally Will, Discretionary Killing, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 1976, at 96.
124. Note 9 and accompanying text supra.
125. Information Release of National Gay Task Force, 80 5th Ave., New York, New
York 10011, Oct. 20, 1976.
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more, a bill has been sponsored in Congress to include "affectional or sexual preferences" among protected civil rights} 26

.

.

